WhaleMu – JP Morgan’s Next Surprise?

Cross-posted from nakedcapitalism.

In an admittedly strange twist of timing JP Morgan, the same JP Morgan that just announced a surprise $2 billion loss caused by the “London Whale,” became the first and only of 26 banks disclosing subprime investor data to flip me the digital bird, refusing access to the public loan-level performance data for their Washington Mutual loans. WaMu, one of the most reckless subprime lenders, was swallowed whole by JPM and they’re having serious indigestion.

Nelson D. Schwartz and Jessica Silver-Greenberg of the New York Times verify that the purpose of the Chief Investment Office — the London Whale — is to offset risk caused by the Washington Mutual loans:

Under Mr. Dimon’s leadership, the chief investment office — which was responsible for the outsize credit bet — was retooled to make larger bets with the bank’s money, a former employee said. Bank executives said the chief investment office expanded after JPMorgan Chase’s 2008 acquisition of Washington Mutual, which added riskier securities to the company’s portfolio. The idea behind the strategy was to offset that risk.

It isn’t hard to figure out why JP Morgan doesn’t want anybody looking into and through their garbage. I have not been able to ascertain whether these reports are required under disclosure requirement Regulation AB (the law itself seems to say yes, but the experts I spoke to gave divergent readings). Whether they are or aren’t, JPM’s refusal — when everybody else cooperated speaks for itself.

As those loans sour, and they continue to rot like a dead skunk on a hot July day, the bets needed to offset the losses are increasing. It looks like the bank, peering into that portfolio they refuse to share, is becoming more than a little bit desperate. Like a compulsive gambler after a multi-day bender resulting in crippling losses they decided to double down rather than walk away, leading to their current whale of a surprise and likely a mirror-image follow-up for the WaMu losses this was supposed to offset.

For anybody who believes that JPM’s position is normal .. it isn’t. Twenty-six other banks quickly popped open the doors to their repositories, as they’re required to do. Perennial bad-boy Aurora Loan Services is the only other one that’s ignored my requests, though since it looks like they’ve sold their servicing operations the jury’s out whether their silence is purposeful or whether there’s nobody home on the other side of those requests.

Like I said, I’m not sure whether these disclosures are exempt. There are certainly many marked private, but they seem to be overwhelmingly CDOs and similar more exotic or clearly closely held instruments. I’ve never seen an entire series of MBS from an issuer that is exempt: even a few stray WaMu deals that ended up in other repositories are open to the public.

JP Morgan’s insistence that “[t]he site is maintained for JPMorgan Chase RMBS clients,” only, demanding that I include my JP Morgan Chase contact, may be legal but it is unprecedented. In context of their recent trading losses, the knowledge that those losses were to hedge against the WaMu losses, Dimon’s prior comments downplaying both losses, and strong analysis that the WaMu loans are some of the most impaired MBS it’s fair to conclude that JPM is hiding something in the basin of their loan outhouse.

I’ve spent the past couple months holed away downloading MBS data in bulk to enable investors, analysts, academics, government agencies, or whoever else wants to inspect performance information and project losses for every subprime loan trust. When finished, this week hopefully, I’ll have a veritable ABS MRI machine that can peer into the true health of the housing and housing finance market. It’s harder than it sounds: one of those projects where software engineers emerge from their digital caves after months, bleary eyed and long past due for a haircut but holding game-changing technology.

My database, which includes everything except WaMu loans thanks to Jamie, is finally almost finished. But even in preliminary form it is clear that the AAA-rated senior tranches — the ones that really were never supposed to take losses — are toast that’s burning worse by the day. Servicers, trustees, government officials have been doing anything to delay the inevitable losses but when people don’t pay their mortgages, and housing has declined by over 50% in many of their markets, there’s only so much accounting chicanery they can do: the money just isn’t there.

My suspicious are more grounded than tin-hat delusions we’ve been hearing from the housing is hot again crowd. R&R Consulting, a well-regarded structured valuation expert I work closely with conducted a portfolio-wide analysis of undisclosed (“limbo”) losses on RMBS. In a special in-depth report dated February 2012, long before JPM told me piss-off when asking for access to the more granular WaMu loan-level data, they reported that WAMU had the highest limbo loss level–about $810 million—in just one transaction. Repeat: experienced analysts dug this out even without loan level data. It sounds likely that it won’t be long until Dimon reports another ten-figure surprise that I’m sure he’ll apologetically pawn off on the US taxpayer.

For anybody asking “um — isn’t this over — didn’t all this fall apart back in 2008?” the answer is not really. That mega-meltdown was really a mini tremor caused by the lower and smaller tiers of these securities; last time junior visited to stir things up but this time papa’s walking down the street carrying a mean look and a big stick. That’s because the mezzanine level tranches of most bubble-era MBA are either gone or guaranteed to be gone — finally eaten up by current or pending losses — leaving the lower AAA tranches to take their place as the bearer of losses. This was never supposed to happen. Everybody knew that CDOs created from the lower tranches were risky, even if the ratings agencies said otherwise, but nobody thought the meltdown would last this long that the actual top tranches would be nicked. But the data couldn’t be clearer: those bottom level A-class tranches of yesterday are the new bottom level M-class tranches of yesterday.

All this is surprising because these same MBS tranches have been on fire lately. Hedge funds bought them for very little when nobody wanted them — setting their own price — and now they’re selling them back at steep gains because housing is peachy again, never mind the enormous amount of shadow inventory. Hopefully the buyers of these same securities aren’t being set up, again, because nobody would be stupid enough to fall for that same trick, again. Hopefully.

It is these lower tranches and other derivative products, which are by definition exponentially smaller than the more senior securities like the ones JPM is hiding (well, before the banks multiplied them several times over using credit default swaps) that blew up the world economy in 2008.

I’m guessing that it is the inevitable meltdown of what remains of the AAAs (the amount outstanding has been reduced considerably by refis) that has been at the impetus for the housing cheerleaders. By refusing to move their foreclosures forward, then refusing to take title, then refusing to REO those homes, the trusts don’t have to recognize the losses because, ya’ know, the abandoned and dilapidated properties will magically double in value as long as we hold our breath and wish.

My mountain of data that shows loss severity in excess of 100-percent is not uncommon. When we look at the loans, compare similar loans from those who report them more honestly, multiply the average severity by pending reported and, um, overlooked foreclosures, then it becomes clear that the lowest rated AAA’s are toast. This reaffirms the report by R&R Consulting report that $175 billion of loan level losses had not been allocated to the trusts. Whoops!

Jamie Dimon admitted his $2 billion loss “plays right into the hands of a bunch of pundits out there” on his conference call explaining his stinky. Dimon went on to call the losses “egregious” and “self-inflicted.” In light of the London Whale it is clear that when it comes to sky-high risk, like JPM’s WaMu exposure, the bank has adopted an advanced risk management strategy: telling researchers to piss off then hiding.

Au revoir Allonhill: OCC Finally Pulls The Plug

I first wrote about massively conflicted OCC foreclosure review firm Allonhill on nakedcapitalism, here:
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/12/michael-olenick-the-administration-likes-foxes-in-charge-of-henhouses-%E2%80%93-proof-that-occ-foreclosure-reviews-are-a-sham.html

Gretchen Morgenson picked it up for the NYT, here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/business/foreclosure-relief-dont-hold-your-breath-fair-game.html

Took a few months but now the OCC has reacted; Allonhill’s finished:
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-74.html

Sue, meet David J. Stern. He can tell you what happened to his sham company DJSP after I showed his investors he was grossly misleading them.

To Sue Allon, and all those out there like her:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rY0WxgSXdEE&feature=relmfu

Updated: That last part where the OCC arrogantly proclaims “The decision does not reflect on the quality of work performed to date by Allonhill” is bunk.  Of course it does.  Every Aurora/Allonhill file needs to be reviewed by a genuinely independent auditor.  Send the bill for the re-reviews to Sue Allon, to John Walsh who signed off on allowing Sue Allon to review her own work, or to Aurora who thought they’d get away with their latest sleazy trick.  Whoever .. as long as it isn’t US taxpayers.  But obviously they need to start from scratch.

I’ve been posting way too little but…

There’s a reason.  Not an excuse, a reason.  Soon enough I’ll have a data set that will shine the light into the darkest corners in a way that’s never been.  But as I’ve been working with others to code the toughest aggregation project I’ve ever worked on I haven’t forgotten about my readers, or my writing, and I’ll be out of hibernation — both here and on nakedcapitalism — soon enough.

Until then here’s a quote from Steve Jobs that’s keeping me going:

“Time is limited, so don’t waste it living someone else’s life.  Don’t be trapped by dogma, which is living with the results of other people’s thinking. Don’t let the noise of other’s opinions drown out your own voice.  And, most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition; they somehow truly already know what we want to perform. Everything else is second..  Stay hungry. Stay foolish. I’ve always wished that for myself, and now I wish that for you. Stay hungry. Stay foolish.”

For those looking for more pragmatic advice on the markets check out any entity that has exposure to bubble-era AAA-rated sub-prime MBA tranches.  Then short the crap out of them, or at least get out.  You wouldn’t believe what I’m seeing as the data rolls in .. unless, of course, you would.

Steve Jobs:

Back soon.

 

Categories: Uncategorized

FRB: Blame “collective self-fulfilling mania” rather than Bad Banking

April 16, 2012 5 comments

Hat-tip to David Dayen of Firedog Lake for pointing out a paper from three economists with the Federal Reserve that pushes the outer limits of common-sense.  Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions?  The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis, by Cristopher Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen of the FRB Boston, Atlanta, and Boston respectively.

The authors present 12 “facts,” many which are iffy at best, showing that the bubble was some sort of “collective self-fulfilling mania.”  Arguing (of course) against banking regulations they seem to be saying a modern-day Svengali hypnotized tens of millions of people to take crappy loans.

Before moving onto their twelve facts they demonstrate an alarming lack of understanding about MBS and MBS-related products:

“.. the top rated tranches of Wall Street’s mortgage-backed securities performed much better than the top-rated tranches of its collateralized debt obligations, another type of structured security.  This discrepancy occurred even though both types of securities were ultimately collateralized by subprime mortgages, and even though both types of securities were constructed by the same investment banks.”  - Why Did So Many People…, Pg. 4.

Keep in mind how mortgage CDO’s work; bankers would take, say, ten slices from ten different batches of MBS of loans that were rated non investment grade.  They’d then bundle them together and rate the top part of the new bundle — the very same loans that had been judged non investment grade — as magically now being investment grade.

CDO’s are analogous to somebody trying to sell you a pile dog droppings.  You’d rightfully saying “have you lost your mind: it stinks.”  Then they’d return with a new pile, made up from 1/10th of the pool of ten different piles, along with an expert who said really doesn’t stink.  Most people would believe both the expert, in this case the bond-ratings agencies, and the seller had lost their mind.  Instead, they believed it didn’t stink and, apparently, so to do these three.

Given a fundamental misunderstanding on how these products work it’s clear they have a similar misunderstanding about how the entire field works.  Let’s move on to those twelve facts.  I’m paraphrasing for brevity.

1. Exploding ARM’s didn’t cause the mess.
Their rationale:  People repaid them during the bubble so it must not be the exploding ARM’s.
My rebuttal: They repaid them because they could obtain financing.  When they could no longer refi, which bankers could and should have anticipated, and the loans exploded, those loans caused a predictable mess.

2. No mortgage was designed to fail.
Their rationale: Nobody would design a product to fail.
My rebuttal: Nobody would design a product to fail .. unless they made lots more money selling it and maintained no liability for the failure than a well-designed product.

3. There was little innovation in mortgage markets in the 2000s.
Their rationale: Option-ARM’s and the rest have always existed.
My rebuttal: Yep, and were seldom used.  Their use exploded in the mid 2000′s and the economy exploded shortly thereafter.

4. Government policy towards mortgages didn’t change much from 1990 to 2005.
Their rationale: Government started making no down-payment loans to soldiers fifty years before so the no-down loans to, say, the homeless dude are the same thing.
My rebuttal: No .. it’s not.  WWII veterans had a certain level of inherent underwriting: they’d just returned from years of fighting where they’d cooperated with other countries to kick the crap out of the Axis and, oh yeah, they were alive to take out a loan.  Pulse loan borrowers didn’t meet this criteria.

5. The originate-to-distribute model was not new.
Their rationale: Servicing has been around forever and was used extensively by S&L’s in the 1980′s.
My rebuttal: Umm.. Ahh… Seriously!?  1,000+ S&L bankers ended up in jail.

6. MBSs, CDOs, and other “complex financial products” have been widely used for decades.
Their rational:  In 1977 Salomon Brothers arranged the first private market MBS deal; CDO’s came along in the 1990′s.
My rebuttale: Lew Ranieri, head of the Solomon MBS desk, has repeatedly stated the modern MBS is nothing like his MBS and he’s right. He’s an early, loud, vicious, and vocal opponent of what his invention morphed into. Look, dynamite can be used to help build tunnels and bridges or used by terrorists.  That’s why we strictly regulate its use.

7. Mortgage investors had lots of information.
Their rationale: Self-evident .. they did have lots of information. I use it.
My rebuttal: They were relying on those AAA ratings and everybody knew it. Borrowers listened to their crooked mortgage brokers and crooked appraises; investors listened to the crooked ratings agencies. Dumb?  Probably. Fraud?  Yes, since both mortgage brokers, appraisers, and ratings agencies knew their paid-for opinions were being relied upon. You’re all economists and know the problems of information asymmetry.

8. Investors understood the risks.
Their rationale:  Lehman released models showing a 17% decline in housing prices would cause enormous investor losses, labeling this a “meltdown.”
My rebuttal: Again, information asymmetry.  Anybody whose home only lost 17% from the height of the bubble here in FL would be dancing on their tables. Labeling this “meltdown” rather than “reality” speaks for itself: they didn’t understand.

9. Investors were optimistic about house prices.
Their rationale:  Lehman and others showed home prices appreciating.
My rebuttal: Yes, they did .. didn’t they?  I don’t remember many investment bank analysts warning about bubbles in 2005.

10. Mortgage market insiders were the biggest losers.
Their rationale: They melted their banks down.
My rebuttal: But the  people who melted the market kept the big bonus checks, even while their banks were smoldering. It’s not about the “banks,” but the people in them. I’d also personally urge the authors to talk to some parents who lost their home about how they explained it to the kids about who the genuine biggest losers are.

11. Mortgage market outsiders were the biggest winners.
Their rationale:  Famous housing shorts, who were not involved in housing except to buy CDS, made a killing.
My rebuttal: True, but insiders who came before them made an even bigger killing, though they killed their own banks in the process.  It is disingenuous to ignore the amounts of money pocketed by insiders  during the bubble and, instead, to look only at both parties after the economy melted down.

12. Top-rated bonds backed by mortgages did not turn out to be “toxic.” Top-rated bonds in CDO’s did.
Their rationale: The AAA’s haven’t melted down.
My rebuttal: Yet.  Which is why I’ve been frantically aggregating data and not writing much. Those AAA’s are doomed.  They’ve been playing games to keep them performing but reality always catches up.  The data is compelling: we’re near the end of the AAA-rated road.

In closing the authors maintain “If home buyers knew that future borrowers would not have access to the same financial innovation, they would not have bid up house prices in the first place.”  My rebuttal: Since the meltdown precipitated massive one-sided market interference to prop up banks they should have been regulated.  That is, if lenders were regulated they would not have been able to cause the bubble in the first place.

Woody Guthrie: The Jolly Banker

Not nearly enough time to write lately thanks to my ongoing enormous data project but came across this Woody Guthrie song I thought I’d share.

Since it’s almost Passover/Easter it’s worth pointing out the ancient Israelite’s found themselves jammed-up due to a government that “didn’t remember.”  So, whereas the new material is always interesting it’s always good to take the opportunity to remember that we’ve been here before.

I don’t know if Woody’s copyright is still there.  If so maybe they’ll ask me to take it down, but something tells me Woody would jump out of his grave and start singing it himself if he could.

Click here to hear Woody singing the song.

The Jolly Banker

My name is Tom Cranker and I’m a jolly banker,

I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I safeguard the farmers and widows and orphans,
Singin’ I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

When dust storms are sailing, and crops they are failing,
I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I check up your shortage and bring down your mortgage,
Singin’ I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

When money you’re needing, and mouths you are feeding,
I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I’ll plaster your home with a furniture loan,
Singin’ I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

If you show me you need it, I’ll let you have credit,
I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
Just bring me back two for the one I lend you,
Singin’ I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

When your car you’re losin’, and sadly your cruisin’,
I’m a jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I’ll come and forclose, get your car and your clothes,
Singin’ I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

When the bugs get your cotton, the times they are rotten,
I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I’ll come down and help you, I’ll rake you and scalp you,
Singin’ I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

When the landlords abuse you, or sadly misuse you,
I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.
I’ll send down the police chief to keep you from mischief,
Singin’ I’m jolly banker, jolly banker am I.

OCC Hack (er, head) John Walsh Is Gone

March 29, 2012 1 comment

The Senate apparently appointed somebody else.

Who?  It doesn’t matter, as long as it’s not the worst regulator in US history.

Here’s a story about Walsh, his OCC, and me:

http://nyti.ms/v8P55e

Walsh defended the conflict, even as Aurora was being quietly sold to Nationstar.  Walsh was then just as quietly fired.  That’s a shame because if I didn’t still have some liberal blood in me I would have advocated an old fashioned tar and feathering, or at least handcuffs.

My feelings towards Walsh’s well deserved place among the ranks of the unemployed:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHQLQ1Rc_Js&feature=related

Categories: Uncategorized

Fannie & Freddie Signal Congress By Spending $600K at the MBA Convention

March 23, 2012 3 comments

Oops, they did it again.

Mortgage Daily News reports Fannie and Freddie spent $600K in Oct., 2011 at the MBA’s annual convention.  In 2010 they spent $640K on the same conference and Congress went ballistic.  Apparently Fannie, Freddie, and the FHFA thought the outrage of our elected officials warranted a change, so they responded by reducing spending by a whole 6.25%.

I shouldn’t be writing.  I’m backed up with arguably the most complicated and important data aggregation project I’ve ever been involved in.  When finished I’ll be pushing out chart’s that make CR’s chart fascination look benign.

But I can’t help but to take a few minutes and digitally ink a few words about this.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac just stuck up the middle-finger to you, Congress, and to the American’s that you’re supposed to represent.  Will you finally do something meaningful about it?

Unlike many I don’t think that Ed DeMarco is evil incarnate.  I think that he’s doing his best given the constraints of HERA but he’s dealing with two unruly, entitled, dishonest beasts who hold themselves above the law, who have shown that they can’t be regulated, and who need to be unwound.

Let’s finally change HERA, the law that funds these monsters.  Let’s admit we can’t mend it, and finally end it. 

It’s time for Congress members to stand, Reagan-style, in front of their headquarters and scream “Fellow members of Congress, tear down these organizations.”

This isn’t a Democrat nor Republican problem: Fannie and Freddie have become the vision of an equal-opportunity contemptuous monster.  They’re like the child of parents who bitterly divorced and who later realizes he can play them off one another, listening to neither, while repeatedly spending wildly on their credit-cards then sneering when called out.

Speaking of children, my own son is in a public charter-school math and science program where three years of honors high-school math are required before starting high-school.  His class is the first where Hon. Algebra II wasn’t offered in summer-school because of budget cuts, so they took the class online.  Teachers confirm that the whole group has struggled substantially more in pre-calc and now calc classes than their predecessors who had a real teacher for what is, for eighth graders, a tough class.

Congress, why don’t we have enough money to fund honors math classes for our brightest kids — the one’s who have proven by working their asses off that they’re the future one-percent types that pay all those taxes — but we do have $180 billion to fund these reckless, worthless, market-destroying organizations.

Here’s a blueprint to burn down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:

1. Over 3-6 months auction the portfolio, the loans they own, at whatever the private market is willing to pay.  Allow people to “buy” their houses out of the pool at auction value plus a small administrative fee, and the rest go to private investors.  Leave the guarantees intact since they’re contractual obligations.  If people scream this is “illegal,” that it’s some type of taking, then just stop funding them, call Fannie and Freddie’s own loans when they miss a payment, and allow a bankruptcy judge to do what the Constitution contemplates should be done to bankrupt organizations.  Since Fannie and Freddie executives advocate for fast foreclosures I’m sure they’ll be enthusiastic at their own organizations quick liquidation; they can quickly pack and leave, with no severance.

2. Create a new organization to continue the guarantees, albeit on a ramp-down period of 5-8 years until the private market can find it’s footing.  That is, for the first 48 months the guarantee program will continue as-is, though with first-loss provisions for originators, then over the next 36 months the maximum volume of guarantees would be reduced by 1/36th of the volume from the first 48 months.  Then .. they’re gone; nothing but a bad memory of failed social experiment that caused immeasurable suffering.

That’s it.  Loans will be held by private organizations who have shown they have a substantially lower 12-month re-default rate, who are willing to write down principal when they realize it is in their bests interests, and who — while they’re far from perfect — are a lot better than the GSE’s.

Don’t leave them around to “create standards” for new technical infrastructure, their latest gambit.  That’s best left to a consortia of private businesses.  Plenty of people, myself included, would love to compete for this work by creating private businesses that will do this more competently and even more transparently than the GSE’s, since we’re not exempt from disclosure laws and have to answer to market forces.

With this latest move the GSE’s have set the stage for their own well-deserved execution.  Now the question is whether our legislators will have the backbone to do what’s needed.  Any legislator, from either party, that won’t cooperate deserves to lose their jobs this fall.

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